<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><oembed><type>video</type><version>1.0</version><html>&lt;iframe src=&quot;https://www.loom.com/embed/940cdba47fa045b69accdf5429ae371f&quot; frameborder=&quot;0&quot; width=&quot;1114&quot; height=&quot;835&quot; webkitallowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen allowfullscreen&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;</html><height>835</height><width>1114</width><provider_name>Loom</provider_name><provider_url>https://www.loom.com</provider_url><thumbnail_height>835</thumbnail_height><thumbnail_width>1114</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_url>https://cdn.loom.com/sessions/thumbnails/940cdba47fa045b69accdf5429ae371f-00001.gif</thumbnail_url><duration>179.69999999999993</duration><title>Engineering an Attack on Election Anonymity</title><description>In this video, I explain an attack that can potentially de-anonymize participants of an election and link their votes. The attack involves replaying the app ID to produce the same nullifier for a user and attempting to link their identity after the election has taken place. To prevent this, I propose decoupling the registration and voting process by using an anodar for registration and a semaphore for anonymous voting. I also provide a minimal demo of our application.</description></oembed>