video1.0<iframe src="https://www.loom.com/embed/b66cfb28f41b452c8cb6debceea35631" frameborder="0" width="1152" height="864" webkitallowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen allowfullscreen></iframe>8641152Loomhttps://www.loom.com8641152https://cdn.loom.com/sessions/thumbnails/b66cfb28f41b452c8cb6debceea35631-cf9905c6444345d0.gif285.068We use Uniswap V4’s hook to implement a new batch-auction style MEV-resilient mechanism for AMM. Our approach expands the recent theoretical work of https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3564246.3585233, and mitigates MEVs by imposing a specific transaction ordering rule so that transactions in different directions (buy or sell) are matched as much as possible. A technical challenge in our hook implementation is that we need to impose constraints (the transaction ordering rule) on the block level instead of individual transaction levels. Our MEV-resilient AMM has a nice property in that an MEV-maximizing builder will order transactions in such a way that no MEV opportunities remain.